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Previous work has shown that firms in low and middle-income countries in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia that feel greater pressure to innovate from their competitors are more 
likely to introduce new products and services than firms do not (Carlin et al., 2001; World Bank, 
2004).  However, competition also appears to affect innovation in other ways.  In particular, 
firms in these countries that face greater price competition appear to be less likely to innovate 
than other firms (Carlin et al., 2001).  The goal of this paper is to assess how competition and 
trade policy affect these different aspects of competition and, consequently, to assess their net 
impact on innovation.  The paper finds that reducing tariffs and enacting and enforcing 
competition laws modestly increases both the pressure that firms feel regarding innovation and 
the level of price competition in the domestic economy.  The net impact that lower tariffs have 
on new product and process development appears to be negative but small – for the most part the 
opposing effects cancel out.  In contrast, stricter competition laws and better enforcement of 
those laws appear to increase the likelihood of new product and process development, especially 
when competition is treated as endogenous to innovation. 
 
   2
I. INTRODUCTION 
Whether competition policy affects new product development and the introduction of 
new production processes in low and middle-income countries will depend upon at least two 
things.  First, it will depend upon the effect of competition policy on competition in these 
countries.  If competition laws are poorly enforced or competition policy is heavily politicized, 
they might have a minor, or even a negative, impact on competition.  Second, it depends upon 
the effect of competition on innovation.  Although enterprises in competitive sectors will 
generally have stronger incentives to introduce new products and reduce the cost of producing 
existing products, competition affects the resources that they have to invest in innovative 
activities. The goal of this paper is to empirically assess the impact of competition policy on 
innovation in low and middle-income countries using enterprise-level data from 27 low and 
middle-income countries in Europe and Central Asia. 
The first issue is how much do different aspects of competition policy—trade policy, 
regulatory barriers to entry and competition law—affect competition in low and middle-income 
countries.  Trade policy is perhaps the least controversial; there seems to be a relatively strong 
consensus that trade liberalization increases competition.
1  For regulatory barriers to entry, there 
is considerably less empirical evidence—although results from some studies suggest that it might 
be important. In contrast, the effectiveness of competition, or anti-trust, law is controversial, 
even in industrialized economies.  Based upon a survey of existing work and some new empirical 
work on the effect of mergers on price markups, Crandall and Winston (2003, p. 4) conclude that 
there is ‘little empirical evidence that past [anti-trust policy] interventions have provided much 
direct benefit to consumers or significantly deterred anti-competitive behavior’ in the United 
States.
2  Competition law is even more controversial in low and middle-income countries, where 
it is perceived to be less effective than it is in industrialized economies.  For example, in a recent 
survey that asked enterprise managers about the effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy in their 
                                                 
1 Tybout (2003) and World Bank (2002) summarize this literature. 
2 Other studies, however, have questioned their conclusions.  See Werden (2004) and Baker (2003).   3
country, managers in low and middle-income countries were less likely to report that they 
believed it was effective.
3 
In addition to depending upon how competition policy affects competition, the impact 
will also depend upon how competition affects new product and process development.  On the 
one hand, competition might increase the incentives that firms have to introduce new products 
and processes—if they fail to keep up, they will quickly find themselves overtaken by nimbler 
competitors.  On the other, firms that face less competition might be able to use their market 
power to generate the resources that they need to finance new product and process development.  
In low and middle-income countries with poorly developed financial sectors, these resources 
might be especially important. 
Previous work has shown that firms in low and middle-income countries in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia that feel greater pressure to innovate from their competitors are more 
likely to introduce new products and services than firms do not (Carlin et al., 2001; World Bank, 
2004).  However, competition also appears to affect innovation in other ways.  In particular, 
firms in these countries that face greater price competition appear to be less likely to innovate 
than other firms (Carlin et al., 2001).  The paper’s goal is to extend the current literature by 
assessing how competition and trade policy affect these different aspects of competition and, 
consequently, to assess their net impact on new product and process development in low and 
middle-income countries.  First, it looks at how trade and competition policy affect these two 
aspects of competition.  It then uses these estimates to assess the net impact of competition and 
tariff policy on innovation.  It concludes that if trade policy has any effect on innovation, it is 
relatively modest.  However, there is some evidence that competition law and policy might have 
a more significant impact. 
                                                 
3 The survey asked managers to give a score on a 7-point scale, where 1 means ‘lax and not effective at promoting 
competition’ and 7 means ‘effective and promotes competition’.  In 2003, the average score in low-income countries 
was 3.1, the average score in lower middle-income countries was 3.4, the average score in upper middle-income 
countries was 3.6 and the average score in high-income OECD countries was 5.1(Porter et al., 2004).   4
II. COMPETITION, COMPETITION POLICY AND INNOVATION  
II.1  The impact of policy on competition in low and middle-income countries 
Many government policies affect competition. One of the most direct ways that policy 
affects competition is through competition law.  Although the goals, approach and scope of 
competition law vary between jurisdictions, the primary goal of most of these laws is to maintain 
and encourage competition and to prevent firms from gaining control of markets.  Competition 
laws often include provisions intended to:
4 
•  Prevent firms in the same industry from colluding or forming cartels.  Prohibited actions 
include price-fixing agreements, collusion during tenders, and agreements to allocate 
markets. 
•  Prevent single dominant firms from exercising market power.  Prohibited actions include 
predatory pricing, forcing firms that buy particular goods or services to also buy other 
goods or services, and setting discriminatory prices or terms of service. 
•  Require firms to notify the competition agency about horizontal mergers between firms in 
the same industry and vertical mergers between firms and their suppliers or distributors—
and allowing the agency to investigate and prohibit mergers. 
Competition laws have become increasingly popular in recent years.  According to one 
recent study, around 100 countries now have competition (or antitrust) laws to address behavior of 
this kind—38 of these enacted laws for the first time or significantly strengthened existing 
competition legislation in the 1990s (Evenett, 2003).  The transition economies of Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia were among the most enthusiastic adopters.  By 1999, all of the transition 
economies except Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkmenistan had at least drafted competition laws 
(Dutz and Vagliasindi, 2000; Vagliasindi and Campbell, 2004). 
Overall, the empirical literature on the effect that competition law has on competition yields 
mixed results.  A cross-country study of competition law in 42 developed and developing countries 
                                                 
4 These are based upon the recommendations in United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2003).  
Also see Evenett (2003).   5
found little evidence that competition law had a direct effect on prices; price markups were no lower 
in countries with competition laws in place than they were in other countries (Kee and Hoekman, 
2003).  However, a second study that looked at the impact of competition policy in Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia concluded that enterprises were more likely to have competitors in countries where 
competition law was stronger and better enforced (Vagliasindi, 2001).  One difference between 
these two papers, other than the choice of dependent variable, is that whereas the first simply uses a 
dummy variable indicating whether the country had a law or not, the second uses a broader measure 
that takes implementation into account. 
There are several reasons why competition law might be ineffective, especially in low 
and middle-income countries.  One is that the agencies that enforce the laws in developing 
economies typically have fewer administrative and financial resources than agencies in 
industrialized economies.  This is especially true in low-income countries.  For example, in 2000, 
the competition authority in Tanzania had only two economists and no lawyers, while the 
authority in Zambia had four economists and one lawyer (CUTS Center for Competition, 2003). 
A second problem is that it can be difficult to prosecute politically connected firms.  For 
example, when the independent Monopoly Control Authority in Pakistan tried to take actions to 
reduce cartelization in the cement and vanaspati ghee markets, the government intervened, fixing 
prices at a ‘mutually acceptable’ level (CUTS Center for Competition, 2003).  Similarly, when 
the competition authority in Tanzania forbade Tanzania Breweries from barring independent 
agents and mini-wholesalers from stocking competitors’ products, the company, with support of 
some government officials, contravened the agency’s orders (Economic and Social Research 
Foundation (ESRF), 2002).  When government officials intervene against agency decisions on 
behalf of politically connected firms, competition agencies will be hesitant to move against these 
firms in the first place. This can be especially problematic in low and middle-income countries, 
which typically have weak institutional environments.    Unless the agency can rely upon the 
judiciary to support its decisions and protect it against political intervention, the agency will find 
it difficult to enforce its rulings even if it is formally independent. 
Competition law is not the only type of government policy that affects competition.   
Whereas competition law is generally intended to prevent firms from gaining control of markets,   6
other government policies reduce competition.  One notable way that governments reduce 
competition is by restricting access to foreign goods in the domestic market.  Tariff and non-
tariff barriers make it more costly for foreign firms to enter domestic markets and consequently 
reduce the competitive pressure on domestic firms. 
Many studies have found results that are consistent with the idea that trade restrictions 
reduce competition.
5  Hoekman et al. (2001) conclude, based upon a cross-country analysis of 41 
developed and developing countries, that average price markups are lower in countries with 
greater import penetration.  Kee and Hoekman (2003) reach a similar conclusion.  Country-level 
studies also support the hypothesis that imports put competitive pressure on domestic firms.  
Based upon a series of country case studies looking at Chile between 1979 and 1986, Colombia 
between 1977 and 1985, Mexico between 1985 and 1990, Morocco between 1984 and 1989 and 
Turkey between 1976 and 1985, Roberts and Tybout (1996) conclude that foreign competition 
resulted in reduced price mark-ups in every country in their study.  Similarly, Harrison (1994) 
and Levinsohn (1993) show that trade liberalization reduced price markups in Côte d’Ivoire and 
Turkey respectively. 
Another way that governments affect competition is by restricting entry.  In some cases, 
for example when governments award legal monopolies, entry is simply prohibited.  In other 
cases, the high fixed cost of meeting regulatory requirements can reduce competition by making 
it difficult for new firms to enter.  The cost of business registration is high in many low and 
middle-income countries, including in many countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.   
Whereas it takes only about 31 days and costs only about 10 percent of per capita GNI to register 
a business in high-income OECD countries, it takes 48 days and cost 22 percent of GNI in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia (World Bank, 2003).
6   
These barriers can reduce entry rates, and thus competition, significantly.  A recent study 
found that entry rates for new enterprises in several middle-income countries—none of whom 
had exceptionally high costs by developing country standards—would increase by as much as 20 
                                                 
5 This literature is summarized in Tybout (2003). 
6 Costs are calculated for a standard enterprise (e.g., in terms of size and sector) across countries in January 2003.   7
percent if they reduced the cost of registering a business to the cost of doing so in the United 
States (Bartelsman et al., 2004).
7  To the extent that these barriers discourage entry, they will 
also reduce competition. 
II.2  The impact of competition on innovation in low and middle income countries 
In addition to depending upon the effectiveness of government policy in promoting 
competition, the effect of competition policy on innovation will depend upon the complex 
relationship between competition and innovation.  Theoretical models do not unambiguously 
predict whether competition should encourage or discourage innovation, with different models 
predicting opposite effects.  Perhaps the most common view of the relationship is that 
competition is likely to encourage innovation.  For example, Adam Smith (1776, cited in Nickell, 
1996) argued “monopoly…is a great enemy to good management” and Hicks (1935) argued that 
one of the main benefits of monopoly is that it allowed companies to enjoy a quiet life.  If firms 
in competitive industries fail to introduce new products or new technologies that reduce costs, 
nimbler competitors will quickly force them out of the market.  In contrast, firms with market 
power—especially those protected by government laws or regulations that make entry difficult 
and those that can protect their position by engaging in anticompetitive behavior—might not face 
the same risks if they fail to innovate.  
Theoretical models that formalize these ideas often rely upon the concept of ‘managerial 
slack.’ Rather than simply maximizing profits, managers also want to minimize effort.  Although 
enterprise owners want to stop managers from slacking, this might be easier in competitive 
industries since owners can compare the enterprise’s performance with the performance of its 
competitors in these industries (Nickell, 1996).  These ideas have been formalized in several 
theoretical models.  For example, in a model with both managers whose goal is to minimize 
effort without going out of business (i.e., ‘satisficing’ managers) and profit-maximizing 
managers, Aghion et al. (1999) show that product market competition can encourage innovation. 
                                                 
7 The countries were Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Hungary, Latvia, Mexico, Romania, Slovenia, and Venezuela.   
Increases exceeded 10 percent in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico and exceeded 20 percent in Colombia, Hungary, and 
Venezuela.   8
This is not the only way, however, that competition might affect innovation. A second 
common view is the ‘Schumpeterian’ view that firms will only innovate if they are able to 
recoup the cost of innovation through the capture of monopoly rents.  Indeed, this is the goal of 
patent protection; patents create temporary monopolies that allow innovating firms to exploit 
their ideas without having to compete with competitors who otherwise would be able be able to 
expropriate their ideas.  Without the creation of the temporary monopoly, firms might be 
unwilling to invest resources in research and development.  In summary, firms that face strong 
competition might have little reason to invest in new product or process development since if 
they do innovate, their competitors will quickly copy their ideas, dissipating rents and preventing 
the innovating firm from recouping its investment. 
These arguments might be particularly important in developing countries.  In addition to 
having a greater incentive to invest in innovative activities, firms with market power will also 
have greater ability to do so.  Even when firms are not introducing entirely new technologies or 
products, copying and adapting existing technologies can be costly, especially when the adapting 
firms is less technological developed than the market leader.
8  Consequently, to the extent that 
firms with market power have more stable (and larger) cash flows and face less market 
uncertainty, they will find it easier to invest in new products and processes (Nickell, 1996).  In 
low and middle-income countries with underdeveloped financial markets, firms have to rely 
upon retained earnings for investment, making these arguments especially important. 
Although the previous arguments suggest that competition in the market might 
discourage innovation, a different type of competition—competition for the market—might 
encourage innovation.  When firms can use patents—or other mechanisms—to protect new 
innovations, innovations allow firms to either gain market power or lower their costs relative to 
their rivals.  Under these circumstances, competition for the market might increase innovation as 
                                                 
8 Mansfield et al. (1981) finds that, on average, it cost imitating firms 65% of the cost of innovation to imitate new 
products.  In one seventh of the cases, imitation costs were at least as high as innovation costs.  Mansfield et al. 
(1981) note ‘this was not due to any superiority of the imitative product over the innovation.  Instead, in a 
substantial percentage of these cases, it was due to the innovator having a technological edge over its rivals in the 
relevant field.’  They also found that although patents increased the cost of imitation, the median estimated increase 
was only 11%.   9
firms try to quickly develop and patent new ideas before their rivals do.
9  Although early work 
suggested that innovation will be faster when more participants are competing for the market 
(Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980), more recent work has suggested that the effect of increased 
competition will depend upon a variety of factors including the nature of the innovation (i.e., 
whether innovation leads to large or small cost reductions) and the intensity of competition in the 
market.
10   
Because these arguments rely upon innovating firms being able to protect their 
intellectual property, a natural question is whether this is likely to be the case for the mostly 
small and medium-sized enterprises from low and middle-income countries covered in this 
paper.  Many of the new products and processes introduced by firms in these countries are likely 
to be new to the firm rather than new to the market.  Given the relatively low number of patents 
issued to firms in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (see Table 1), it seems plausible that few of 
the products and processes introduced by the mostly small and medium-sized enterprises will be 
covered by patents (i.e., there will be less of a distinction between competition for the market 
and competition in the market).  A second point is that research and development might not be as 
important for these firms with respect to the introduction of new products and processes in these 
countries as it would be for firms in high-income countries.  For example, in a recent survey of 
enterprises in Serbia and Montenegro, only 10 percent said that the most important way that they 
acquired technological innovations was developing or adapting them internally.
11  T h e  m o s t  
popular way of acquiring new technologies (36 percent of enterprises) was through purchasing 
new machinery and equipment. 
Several recent studies have looked at the impact of competition on labor and total factor 
productivity in the transition economies.  A recent meta-analysis of results from these studies 
concluded that competition generally results in improved productivity (Djankov and Murrell, 
2002).  In general, they find that results tend to stronger for domestic competition than for 
                                                 
9 See, for example, Aghion et al. (1999) and Aghion et al (2001).   
10 Encaoua and Hollander (2002) summarize this literature. 
11 Data is from the Investment Climate Survey for Serbia and Montenegro in 2003 © The World Bank Group.  This 
question was not asked in the 2002 BEEPS Survey.   10
competition from imports and tend to be stronger for countries in Eastern Europe than for 
countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States.  In fact, they find that competition from 
imports has a negative, although statistically insignificant impact, in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States.
12 
Although these results are consistent with the idea that competition encourages 
innovation, productivity improvements are not necessarily the result of innovation.  For example, 
improvements could be due to increased effort (e.g., by management) without the introduction of 
new products or production technologies.  Consistent with this idea, recent studies that have 
looked at the effect of competition on new product and process development suggest a more 
nuanced picture.  On the one hand, pressure from other firms to develop new products, services 
and markets appears to be important.  Firms that felt greater pressure, especially from foreign 
firms, were more likely to introduce new products or to use new production technologies than 
firms that felt less pressure (Carlin et al., 2001; World Bank, 2004).    However, Carlin et al. 
(2001) also found that firms with greater market power were more likely to innovate.  Thus, 
competition does not appear to have an unambiguous effect on innovation in low- and middle-
income countries.  
III. EMPIRICAL METHODS AND RESULTS 
III.1 Data 
The data used in this study are from the 2002 Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey II (BEEPS II), an enterprise-level survey that covered 27 countries in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
13  MEMRB Custom Research Worldwide conducted the 
survey on behalf of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World 
                                                 
12 Using data from five countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Bastos and Nasir (2004) conclude that 
competition has a greater affect on productivity than the quality of infrastructure, corruption or bureaucratic burden. 
13 The BEEPS II survey is described in greater detail in Fries et al. (2003) and Hellman and Kaufmann (2002).  The 
countries are Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, FYR Macedonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkey, 
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.  The survey covered all countries in the region in which the EBRD operates, other than 
Turkmenistan.   11
Bank.  MEMRB followed the ICC/ESOMAR International Code of Marketing and Social 
Research Practice. Enterprises participating in the survey were assured that their identities would 
not be disclosed to the government.  Enumerators interviewed firm managers in a uniform way 
across countries in face-to-face meetings.  
The sampling frame was constructed to be broadly representative of enterprises within 
each country in terms of sector, size and geographic location.  Certain firms were excluded from 
the survey.  These included firms in sectors that were subject to government price and prudential 
regulations (e.g., utilities and banks) and in the agricultural sector, firms with fewer than two 
employees or more than 10,000 employees, and firms that were less than three years old.  The 
final restriction was imposed because some questions (e.g., on business performance) covered 
the period 1999 to 2001.  In addition, at least 10 percent of enterprises were required to be in the 
following categories: small (less than 50 employees), medium (50 to 249 employees) and large 
(more than 250 employees), foreign controlled, state-controlled, exporters and from small cities 
(under 50,000 people) or rural areas.   
The survey included enterprises in services, manufacturing, construction, and mining and 
quarrying.  Since this paper is interested in the effect of both trade policy and competition policy, 
the sample in this paper only includes manufacturing firms.  The data from BEEPS II are 
supplemented with additional data collected by the World Bank and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development.  Tariff data is obtained from the UNCTAD TRAINS database.  
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the main variables included in the empirical analysis.  
III.2 Econometric  Approach 
To address the first question—the effect that competition policy and trade policy have on 
competition—we estimate the following equation: 
ijk k j j ijk j jk ijk z x policy n competitio tariff Index n Competitio ε η λ γ β δ + + + + + ∂ + = 2 1    (1) 
The competition indices represent the amount of competition that firm i in country j and 
sector k faces.  Higher values on the indices represent higher levels of competition.  The three 
indices that are analyzed are:   12
•  Index of Domestic Price Competition.  This index represents that amount of domestic 
sales that the enterprise manager believes the firm would lose if it raised prices by 10 
percent in real terms while its competitors did not.  A “1” on this 4-point scale means that 
the manager believes that the firm would not lose any sales, while a “4” means that the 
manager believes that many of its customers would buy from its competitors instead. 
•  Index of importance of pressure from foreign competitors on decisions concerning new 
products, services and markets.  This index represents the importance of foreign 
competitors on decisions with respect to development of new products, services and 
markets.  A “1” on the 4-point scale means that pressure from this source is ‘not at all 
important’, while a “4” means that it is very important. 
•  Index of importance of pressure from domestic competitors on decisions concerning new 
products, services and markets.  As above, but for pressure from domestic competitors. 
We focus on these indices because (i) we would generally expect competition policy to 
have a direct effect on each of these measures of competition and (ii) previous work has shown 
that they are associated with innovation (Carlin et al., 2001; World Bank, 2004). 
The indices are limited dependent variables that take four distinct values.  Since the 
numbers are ordered rankings (with higher values indicating greater competition), but are not 
count data, the regressions are estimated as ordered probit regressions (i.e., it is assumed that the 
error term, εijk, has a normal distribution).  One concern is that error terms might be correlated 
for enterprises within the same country.  Since this can result in the standard errors appearing to 
be artificially small, it might inflate the t-statistics especially on country level variables 
(Moulton, 1986).  To control for this, results are presented using Huber-White standard errors, 
allowing error terms to be correlated within countries (i.e., with ‘clustered’ standard errors).
14 
The main variables of interest are the tariff rate, tariffjk, and measures of competition 
policy, competition policyj.  The tariff rate is the average tariff rate for industry j, defined at the 
4-figure ISIC level, in country k.  Unfortunately, comparable information was not available to 
                                                 
14 See Huber (1967) and Rogers (1993).   13
calculate more sophisticated measures of trade protection (e.g., effective protection rates or 
measures that incorporate non-tariff barriers).  
Several measures of competition policy are used in the empirical analysis.  The first 
measure is an index that represents how strict merger notification laws are in the country.  The 
index is based upon the measure of merger notification requirements described in Nicholson 
(2003), with higher values representing stricter laws.
15  The measure of ‘barriers to entry’ is the 
number of days to register a standardized business (World Bank, 2003). In addition to these two 
variables, another measure of competition policy is included in some model specifications as a 
robustness check.  The competition policy index, which represents both competition law and 
barriers to entry, is taken from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2003)    In 
contrast to the previous measures of competition policy, which are based upon legal 
requirements, this measure takes enforcement into account.  One concern about it, however, is 
that although it is based partly upon objective criteria (i.e., whether competition legislation is in 
place), it is partially subjective (e.g., the difference between a ‘3’ and a ‘4’ is based on the 
difference between ‘some enforcement’ and ‘significant enforcement’).
16  This might be 
problematic if the actual level of competition in the economy affects experts’ perceptions about 
competition policy.  Since the competition policy variables are not available at the industry level 
and, therefore, are defined at the country level, they have to be omitted in the regressions that 
include country dummies. 
In addition to the main variables of interest, the analysis includes a series of country (λj) 
and sector dummies (γk).  The country dummies are included to control for unobserved 
differences between countries that affect the level of competition in the country.  For example, 
competition from imports might be less in poor countries or in countries with higher natural 
barriers to trade (e.g., countries that are more remote).  If these characteristics were correlated 
with the policy variables, the coefficients on the policy variables might be biased.  In some 
                                                 
15 The index is coded as “0” if the country has no merger notification law, coded as “1” if merger notification is 
voluntary, coded as “2” if post-merger notification is mandatory, and “3” if pre-merger notification is mandatory.  
Information on notification laws was obtained from White and Case (2004) 
16 For example, the 2003 Transition report states ‘[t]he classification system is a stylized reflection of the judgment 
of the EBRD’s Office of the Chief Economist.’  See European Bank for Reconstruction and Development(2003).   14
regressions, the country dummies are replaced with a small set of country controls (zj).  Because 
we have data from only 27 countries, only a relatively modest number of country controls can be 
included.  The country level controls are per capita GDP, size and population (to proxy for 
natural barriers to trade) and a dummy for countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(as a proxy for remoteness).  Because the country dummies control for country differences more 
completely than the country controls, these results are generally preferable for variables such as 
tariff levels that are not defined at the country level.  Sector dummies—also at the 4-figure ISIC 
level—are included to control for sector characteristics that might affect the level of competition 
in the sector.  For example, sectors characterized by greater economies of scale might be less 
competitive than other sectors.   
In addition to these variables, the regressions also include a series of enterprise-level 
controls (xijk).  These controls include number of workers (as a proxy for size), dummies 
indicating that the firm is partly foreign-owned, partly government owned or a de novo private 
enterprise (as opposed to a privatized enterprise), and a dummy indicating that the enterprise is 
an exporter.   
III.3 Econometric  Results 
Average Tariff Rate.  Enterprises were more likely to report that they would lose 
domestic sales to their competitors if they raised domestic prices by 10 percent and their 
competitors did not in countries where tariffs are lower.  The coefficient on average tariff rates in 
the sector is statistically significant and negative whether country dummies or country controls 
are included in the regression and whether the EBRD competition policy index or the merger 
notification law index and days to register a business are used as controls for competition policy 
(see columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table 3).  As noted previously, the regressions include a set of sector 
dummies, also at the 4-figure ISIC industry level, to control for sector differences that might 
affect competition (e.g., related to economies of scale that might affect the level of competition 
in the sector).   
The parameter estimates suggest that tariff rates have a relatively modest impact on 
domestic price competition.  If tariffs were set at the median level for the sample for all goods 
(10.5 percent), the average estimated score on the competition index would be 2.62 and the   15
average probability that an enterprise would report that many of its customers would buy from its 
competitors if it raised prices by 10 percent would be 28.9 percent.
17  If tariffs were uniformly 
set at level of the 80
th percentile (18.3 percent), the average score would be 2.54 and the average 
probability would be 26.2 percent. If tariffs were uniformly set at the level of the 20
th percentile 
(5 percent), the average score would be 2.67 and the average probability would be 30.9 percent.  
Increasing a uniform tariff from 5 percent to 18.3 percent would therefore reduce the probability 
that the average enterprise would lose many of its customers if it raised prices by 4.7 percentage 
points – about a 15 percent reduction. 
Tariffs also appear to affect pressure from foreign competitors.  Enterprises were less 
likely to feel that pressure from foreign competitors had an important influence on their decisions 
to develop new products, services or markets in countries where tariffs were higher.  The 
coefficient on the average tariff rate was statistically significant and negative whether country 
dummies or country controls and the EBRD competition policy index were included in the 
regression (see columns 5 and 6 of Table 3).  Although the coefficient becomes statistically 
insignificant when the merger notification law index and days to register a business are included 
instead of the EBRD competition policy index, these measures will control for country 
differences less well than the country dummies would.  Overall these results suggest that firms 
feel less pressure from foreign firms in sectors and countries where tariff protection is high.  
The impact is slightly smaller than the impact on domestic price competition.  If tariffs 
were set at a uniform 10.5 percent (the sample median), the average score on the index of 
pressure from foreign firms would be 2.36 and the average probability that a sample firm would 
rate pressure from foreign firms as an important influence on decisions regarding development of 
new products and services is 21.1 percent.  If tariffs were set at a uniform level of 5 percent (the 
20
th percentile), the average score would be 2.38 and the average probability would be 21.8 
percent.  If tariffs were set at a uniform level of 18.3 percent (the 80
th percentile), the average 
score would be 2.32 and the average probability would be 19.2 percent.  Hence, increasing a 
                                                 
17 The average probabilities are calculated using the coefficients from Table 3, column 1.  For each enterprise in the 
sample, the probability that the enterprise would report that many customers would buy from their competitors 
instead if they increased prices by 10 percent is calculated replacing the actual tariff rate for that sector and country 
by the sample median, the 80
th percentile tariff rate, or the 20
th percentile tariff rate.   16
uniform tariff from 5 percent to 18.3 percent would decrease the probability that the average 
enterprise would see pressure from foreign firms as an important influence by 2.6 percentage 
points—a 14 percent decrease. 
Not surprisingly, tariffs do not appear to have a significant impact on the pressure that 
firms feel from domestic firms.  The coefficient on average tariff rate is statistically insignificant 
in analogous regressions for pressure from domestic enterprises (see columns 7-9). 
Competition law and barriers to entry. Enterprises were also more likely to report that 
they would lose customers to competitors if they raised domestic prices by 10 percent and their 
competitors did not in countries with stricter competition laws (see Column 1).  The coefficient 
on the merger notification index is positive and statistically significant in the regression for the 
price competition index.  In contrast, the coefficient on days to register a new business is 
consistently statistically insignificant in all three regressions.  The effect of having a merger 
notification law appears relatively large.  The average score on the price competition index 
would be 2.56 in countries with laws that require pre-merger notification compared to 2.24 in 
countries with no merger notification requirements.  Similarly, the average probability that an 
enterprise would say it would lose many of its customers if it raised prices is 17.5 percent in 
countries with no law, compared to 26.9 percent in countries with a pre-merger notification 
requirement. 
Results are similar when the merger notification law index is replaced with the 
competition policy index.  As noted previously, the competition policy index rates barriers to 
entry as well as competition law and, therefore, the variable for days to register a new business is 
omitted in these regressions. The coefficient on the index of competition policy is also positive 
and statistically significant (see column 2 of Table 3).  The parameter estimates suggest that 
competition policy also has a reasonably modest impact on domestic price competition.  If the 
index were set at the level of the 20
th percentile (2.0), the average score would be 2.55 and the 
average probability would be 26.4 percent.  If it were set at the level of the 80
th percentile (2.7), 
the average score would be 2.66 and the average probability would be 30.2 percent.  Increasing 
the quality of competition policy from the level observed in Georgia or Russia (2.0) to the level 
observed in Estonia or Slovenia (2.7) would increase the average probability that an enterprise   17
would expect to lose many customers to its competitors if it raised prices by 10 percent by 3.8 
percentage points – about a 14 percent increase. 
While tariff rates would only seem to affect the amount of pressure that firms feel from 
foreign competitors, competition policy might affect the pressure that firms feel from both 
foreign and domestic enterprises.  For example, a dominant firm that is able to maintain its 
position through marketing restrictions or control over distribution might be able to effectively 
prevent competition from both domestic firms and imports.   
In the regression for pressure from foreign firms, the coefficient on the merger 
notification index is positive and statistically significant.  This is consistent with the idea that 
pressure from foreign firms is greater in countries with stricter merger notification laws.  The 
effect is, once again, reasonably large.  The average score on the index for pressure from foreign 
firms would be 2.08 if all countries had no notification requirements and 2.37 if all countries had 
pre-merger requirements. 
Although the coefficient on the merger notification index is positive in the regression for 
pressure from domestic firms, it is statistically insignificant at conventional significance levels 
(see column 7).  However, the coefficient on the competition policy index is statistically 
significant at a 5 percent level in the regression for the importance of pressure from domestic 
firms (see column 8 of Table 3).  Increasing the competition policy index from 2.0 to 2.7 
increases the probability that the average firm would rate pressure from domestic firms as very 
important from 22.9 percent to 28.2 percent—a 5.3 percentage point or 23 percent increase—and 
the average score on the index from 2.66 to 2.82.   
Other enterprise-level controls.  For the most part, the coefficients on the enterprise-level 
controls are statistically insignificant at conventional significance levels.  For example, in the 
regression for the index of domestic price competition, the coefficients were statistically 
insignificant on all variables except for the dummy variable indicating that the firm is an 
exporter.   
There were some exceptions to this rule, however.  Large firms were more likely to say 
that pressure from foreign firms was important with respect to developing new products and   18
services, but not more likely to report that domestic price competition was greater nor to report 
that pressure from domestic firms was important. Firms that were at least partially foreign-owned 
were less likely to report pressure from domestic competitors was important, as were firms that 
were at least partially state-owned.  Finally de novo private firms were less likely to report that 
pressure from domestic enterprises was important. 
Firms that export tend to feel less competitive pressure than other firms—at least in 
domestic markets.  They were less likely to report that they would lose customers in domestic 
markets if they raised prices than non-exporters were.  They were also less likely to report that 
they felt that pressure from domestic firms had an important effect on their decisions to develop 
new products, services or markets.  It is important to note that most exporters sell a significant 
portion of their output on domestic markets.  The median exporter exported only about 35 
percent of output and only 9 percent of exporters (5 percent of firms) exported all their output.  
Because exporters tend to be more efficient and technologically advanced than domestic firms 
that do not export, it might not be surprising they generally feel less pressure from other 
domestic enterprises than non-exporters do.  In contrast to the previous results, exporters were 
more likely to report pressure from foreign firms than non-exporters were.  Given that exporters 
are likely to compete with foreign firms in both domestic and international markets, this is not 
surprising. 
Other macroeconomic controls.  The country level controls were generally statistically 
insignificant in the regressions for pressure from domestic firms to develop new products and 
services and for the index of domestic price competition.  In contrast, the coefficients on most of 
these variables were statistically significant in the regression for pressure from foreign firms.  
Pressure from foreign firms was more important in countries with greater population, smaller 
area, higher per capita GDP and that are in the Commonwealth of Independent States.  The 
coefficients on the log of population and the log or area have opposite signs but are very close in 
terms of absolute magnitude.  This suggests that pressure from foreign firms regarding 
development of new products and processes is more important in countries that are more densely 
populated.  One plausible explanation for this is that small densely populated countries are more 
naturally open than larger, less densely populated countries.  Consistent with the idea that 
pressure from foreign firms is more important in countries that are more naturally open, pressure   19
from foreign firms is also less important in countries in the Commonwealth of Independent 
States.  Countries in this region will tend to be further from Western European markets than 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe.  Pressure from foreign firms tends to also be more 
important in countries with higher per capita GDP.  These last two results are not robust to 
including the objective measures of competition policy in place of the competition policy index. 
III.4  Impact on Innovation 
The previous results suggest that competition policy does indeed have a positive impact 
on competition in the low and middle-income countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia.  
Competition law—and possibly barriers to entry—appears to affect both price competition and 
the pressure that firms feel to develop new products and services.  Similarly tariffs appear to 
affect price competition and pressure from foreign firms regarding new products and services.   
A natural question is whether this increased pressure increases the likelihood that firms 
introduce new products and processes.  As noted earlier, although previous research has found 
that firms are more likely to innovate when they feel pressure from competitors (Carlin et al., 
2001; World Bank, 2004), price competition appears to have the opposite effect (Carlin et al., 
2001).  The net impact of competition policy will therefore depend upon the magnitude of the 
effect that competition policy has on price competition and pressure from competitors as well as 
the magnitude of the effect of price competition and pressure from competitors on innovation. 
III.4.1 Estimation 
To estimate the impact that pressure from foreign and domestic firms and price 
competition have on innovation, two dummy variables indicating whether between 1998 and 
2001 the firm (i) introduced a major new product line and (ii) introduced a new technology that 
substantially changed the way it produces its main product are regressed on the competition 
indices from the previous section and a series on control variables. 
ijk k j j ijk ijk ijk z x indices n competitio Innovation ε η λ γ β δ + + + + + = 1  
Since the dependent variables are dummy variables, the model is estimated using probit 
estimation.  The coefficients presented in the tables are marginal effects for continuous   20
independent variables (including the competition indices) and are the effect of switching the 
dummy from “0” to “1” for discrete dummy variables.  These effects are calculated at sample 
means for all variables. 
One concern is that the competition indices tend to be highly correlated.  The correlation 
between the two indices indicating pressure from foreign and domestic firms is 0.14 (p-
value=0.00) and the correlations between the measure of price competition and the two indices 
for pressure from foreign and domestic firms are 0.19 (p-value=0.00) and 0.09 (p-value=0.00) 
respectively.  Because of concerns about multicollinearity, we use principal components analysis 
to construct a single index for pressure from foreign and domestic firms.  As a robustness check, 
we also include the two separate indices for pressure from foreign and domestic firms 
simultaneously.  Because past work has indicated that pressure to innovate and price competition 
affect firms’ decisions regarding innovation differently, we do not attempt to merge all three 
indices into a single measure of competition.  However, we do include the indices for price 
competition and pressure from foreign and domestic firms separately as additional robustness 
checks. 
The control variables include a series of enterprise-level controls, a series of sector 
dummies (at the 4-figure ISIC level), and a series of countries dummies.  As before, to control 
for the possibility that error terms might be correlated for enterprises within the same country, 
‘clustered’ standard errors are presented. 
A concern in this part of the analysis is that the competition indices might be endogenous.  
This is a particular concern for the index for price competition—firms that are particularly 
innovative might be able to reduce price competition by differentiating their products from those 
of their competitors.  Hence, a negative correlation between price competition and innovation 
might be due to innovation reducing price competition rather than price competition reducing 
innovation.  Therefore, as an additional robustness check, we treat the competition indices as 
endogenous, using the trade and competition policy variables as instruments. The policy 
variables would seem to be appropriate instruments in that we would expect competition policy 
to affect innovation primarily through its effect on competition.   21
III.4.2 Results 
Pressure from foreign and domestic enterprises.  Consistent with earlier work, firms were 
more likely to introduce new production technologies and new product lines between 1998 and 
early 2002 when they felt greater pressure from foreign and domestic firms to innovate.  The 
coefficient on the index indicating pressure to innovate from foreign and domestic competitors is 
positive and statistically significant at a 1 percent level or higher in the regressions for the 
introduction of both new production processes (see column 1 in Table 4) and new products (see 
column 1 in Table 5).  The positive coefficients suggests that firms that perceive that they are 
facing greater competitive pressure from competitors to innovate are, indeed, more likely to 
introduce new technologies and production processes.  These results are robust to including 
country dummies rather than country controls (see column 2) and to omitting the index for price 
competition (see column 3). 
The results are also robust to including the two indices for pressure from foreign and 
domestic firms simultaneously rather than the first principal component.  The coefficients on 
both indices are positive and statistically significant at a 10 percent level or higher (see column 
6). Although the point estimate of the coefficient on the index for pressure from foreign firms is 
larger and more highly statistically significant than the coefficient on the index for pressure from 
domestic firms, the coefficients are close in size.  In fact, tests of the null hypotheses that the two 
coefficients are equal cannot be rejected in either regression.
18  Likelihood ratio tests fail to reject 
the model with the first principal component of the two indices in favor of the model with the 
two indices included separately.
19  
The impact of this pressure appears to be quite large.  The estimate of the marginal effect 
(estimated at sample means) is 0.05 in the regression for new process development and 0.07 in 
the regression for new product development.  This suggests that increasing the index for foreign 
firms by 1 point (on a four-point scale) would increase the probability that a firm introduced a 
                                                 
18 The χ
2(1)=0.25 [p-value=0.61] and χ
2(1)=0.36 [p-value=0.55] for new production technologies and new product 
lines respectively.  
19 The χ
2(1)=0.4 and χ
2(1)=0.6 for new production technologies and new product lines respectively.   22
new production technology between 1998 and 2001 by about 5 percentage points and increases 
the probability that the firm developed a new product line by about 7 percentage points.
20   
Although this might suggest that trade and competition policy might have a large effect 
on decisions regarding new products and technologies, it is important to keep in mind that a 1-
point gain is much larger that the changes estimated in the previous section.  Based upon the 
coefficients in the previous sections, decreasing tariffs from 18.3 percent to 5 percent (the 20
th 
percentile and 80
th percentile respectively) would increase the average score on the pressure from 
foreign competitors index by only about 0.06 points—and would have little effect on pressure 
from domestic firms.  Thus, cutting tariffs by this amount would increase the index of pressure 
by only about 0.04.
21  Based upon the coefficients in this section, cutting tariffs by this amount 
would increase the probability that an average firm would develop a major new product by only 
about 0.2 percentage points and that it would introduce a new production technology by only 
about 0.3 percentage points.  Similarly, enacting a law that required pre-merger notification 
would increase the likelihood that the average enterprise would introduce a new process by 1.0 
percentage points and a major new product by 1.4 percentage points.  
Price Competition.  The coefficient on the index for domestic price competition is 
statistically significant and negative in the regressions for new production processes (see column 
1 in Table 4) and new products (see column 1 in Table 5).  In contrast to the previous results, this 
suggests that competition reduces the likelihood of a firm introducing new products and 
processes: firms that face greater price competition are less likely to introduce new products and 
production technologies.  These results are also robust to including country dummies rather than 
country controls (see column 2).  When the index for pressure to innovate is omitted, the 
coefficient on the index for price competition remains statistically significant in the regression 
for new production processes but not for new products (see column 4). 
                                                 
20 Probabilities are estimated using the marginal changes calculated at the means for all variables. 
21 The estimates from the principal component analysis indicate that a one-point increase on the foreign pressure 
index increases the principal component index by 0.62 points and a one-point increase on the domestic pressure 
index increases the principal component index by 0.68 points.   23
Cutting tariffs from 18.3 percent to 5 percent (the 20
th percentile and 80
th percentile 
respectively) would increase the average score on the index by only about 0.13 points.  Thus, the 
coefficients in this section suggest that this would decrease the probability that an average firm 
would introduce new products and production technologies by only about 0.8 and 0.4 percentage 
points respectively.  Similarly introducing a pre-merger notification requirement would decrease 
the average probabilities by 1.9 and 1.0-percentage points respectively.  
The net impact of changes in competition policy is, consequently, quite modest—
although usually negative.  Since changes in competition increase both pressure from 
competitors to innovate and price competition, the net effect on new product and process 
development will be quite modest.  Reducing tariffs from 18.3 percent to 5 percent would 
decrease the probability of new product and process development by 0.6 and 0.1 percentage 
points respectively.  Introducing a pre-merger notification requirement would decrease the 
average probability of introducing a new process by 0.9 percentage points and increase the 
average probability of new product development by 0.5 percentage points.  Improving the 
country’s score on the competition policy index yields similar results.
22 
Other firm characteristics.  Large firms were more likely to introduce new production 
technologies and develop new products and upgrade existing product than smaller firms were.  
The coefficient on this variable is statistically significant at a 5 percent level or higher in both 
regressions.  Firms with any government ownership were about 9 percentage points less likely to 
upgrade production technologies and 16 percentage points less likely to develop new product 
lines.  The coefficients on the dummy variable indicating that the firm was foreign-owned were 
statistically insignificant in all regressions. 
De novo private firms and exporters were more likely to introduce new production 
techniques and new products.  The coefficient on the de novo dummy variable was statistically 
significant and positive in both regressions.  The coefficients on the dummy variable indicating 
the firm is an exporter were positive and statistically significant in both regressions.  The point 
                                                 
22 Increasing the score on the competition policy index would decrease the average probability of new process 
development by 0.1 percentage points and increase the average probability of new product development by 0.5 
percentage points.   24
estimates of the coefficients suggest that exporters were 11 percentage points more likely to 
introduce new product lines and 6 percentage points more likely to introduce new production 
processes. The impact of being a de novo private firm (rather than a privatized firm) was also 
large.  De novo private firms were 8 percentage points more likely to have introduced new 
production technologies and 15 percentage points more likely to develop new product lines. 
III.4.3 Robustness  Checks 
Non-linear effect of competition.  Previous work has suggested that changes in 
competition might have a non-linear effect on innovation (Carlin et al., 2001).  In general, this 
study does not provide strong support for a non-linear effect.  When squared terms are added to 
the base regression, the squared terms are singly and jointly statistically insignificant in the 
regression for the adoption of new production processes (see column 5 in Table 4).
23  In the 
regression for new product development, the coefficient on the squared term for the price 
competition index is statistically insignificant.  In contrast, the coefficient on the squared term 
for the index of pressure from competitors is statistically significant. However, the point 
estimates of the coefficients suggest that increases in pressure from competitors will increase the 
likelihood of innovation across almost all of the range of the index (between 0 and 4).  Based 
upon the coefficient estimates, the turning point is at 3.4—close to the maximum of the range. 
Additional measures of competition.  The measures of competition used throughout the 
analysis are not the only possible measures of competition included in the BEEPS dataset.  Two 
additional measures are the manager’s estimate of his firm’s market share in the domestic market 
and the manager’s estimate of the number of competitors his firm faces in the domestic market.  
The results are generally robust to adding these measures to the regressions (see columns 1-2 and 
4-5 in Table 6).  
The coefficient on market share is statistically insignificant in the regression for both new 
process development and new product development.  The coefficient on pressure from foreign 
                                                 
23 As noted above, to ensure that the index for pressure from competitors is always positive, a constant (2) is added 
to the principal component index before it is squared. As a result the index varies between (just above) zero and (just 
below) four.   25
and domestic competitors remains statistically significant and positive when this variable is 
added to the regression.  The coefficient on domestic price competition remains negative and 
statistically significant in the regression for new process development and remains negative, but 
becomes statistically insignificant. for new product development.  The coefficients on pressure 
from competitors and domestic price competition are slightly smaller in both regressions. 
The coefficient on estimated number of competitors is statistically insignificant in the 
regression for new product development, but is statistically significant in the regression for new 
process development.  However, including this variable does not affect the signs or statistical 
significance of the coefficients on the indices for pressure from competitors or domestic price 
competition.  
Additional measures of pressure to innovate.  The BEEPS II questionnaire also contains 
questions about the effect that pressure from government, creditors, shareholders and customers 
has on decisions to innovate.  These other sources are linked less directly to competition than 
pressure from foreign and domestic competitors.  However, responses to these questions tend to 
be highly correlated—firms that feel pressure to innovate from one source usually feel pressure 
from other sources.
24  Including an additional variable representing other sources of pressure 
does not have a large effect on the previous results (see Table 6, columns 3 and 6).
25  
Coefficients on the indices for pressure from competitors and domestic price competition remain 
statistically significant, although the coefficient on pressure from domestic and foreign 
competitors becomes slightly smaller. 
Endogeneity of the competition indices.  As discussed above, there is some concern that 
product and process development might affect competition.  For example, firms that are more 
innovative might be able to better differentiate their product from the products produced by 
potential competitors.  Consequently, as a robustness check, we allow the level of competition to 
be determined endogenously.  The instruments are the trade and competition policy variables 
                                                 
24 The correlations vary between 0.06 and 0.37 and are statistically significant at greater than a 1 percent level in all 
cases. 
25 The composite variable representing pressure from other sources is the first principle component combining the 
additional measures of pressure.   26
from the previous section.  Since these variables are correlated with the competition indices (see 
previous section) but should not affect innovation other than through their impact on 
competition, they would seem to be reasonable instruments.  Since the dependent variable is a 
dummy variable, the probit equation is estimated using a procedure suggested by Newey 
(1987).
26  Hypothesis tests of the null hypothesis that the competition variables are exogenous 
reject the null at a 10 percent significance level, favoring the results treating the variables as 
endogenous.
27 
The results for the index of pressure from foreign and domestic competitors are robust to 
this change.  The coefficients remain statistically significant and positive after allowing the index 
to be determined endogenously (see columns 2 and 4 of Table 7).  Although the coefficient on 
the price competition index remains negative, it becomes statistically insignificant at 
conventional significance levels.  Dropping the price competition index does not affect the 
results for the index of pressure from foreign and domestic competitors (see columns 1 and 3). 
The coefficients are considerably larger when competition is treated as endogenous than 
when treated as exogenous.  However, for tariffs at least the larger effects are mostly 
offsetting—if the coefficient on the index of price competition is assumed to be the point 
estimate (rather than zero).  Based upon the point estimates of the coefficients in columns 2 and 
4 of Table 7 (i.e., assuming that the coefficient on the index of price competition is not zero), 
reducing tariffs from 18.3 percent to 5 percent would increase the likelihood of new product 
development by 0.2 percentage points, but reduce the likelihood of new process development by 
0.3 percentage points.  Introducing a pre-merger notification would have a greater effect—
increasing the probability of new product development by nearly six percentage points and 
increasing the probability of new process development by about four percentage points.  Using 
                                                 
26 The procedure that we use is the IVTOBIT routine written for STATA by Joe Harkness at John Hopkins 
University.  It implements Amemiya’s GLS estimator using formulas from Newey (1987) 
27 Using a test proposed by Smith and Blundell (1986), the χ
2(2)=5.82 (p-value=0.054) for new production 
processes and χ
2(2)=5.52 (p-value=0.063) for new products.   27
the competition policy index also yields a larger result when competition is assumed to be 
endogenous.
28 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Earlier empirical studies have shown that competition has an ambiguous effect on 
innovation in the low and middle-income economies of Eastern Europe and Central Asia.   
Although pressure from foreign and domestic competitors appears to be positively associated 
with innovation (Carlin et al., 2001; World Bank, 2004), price competition appears negatively 
associated with it (Carlin et al., 2001).  This paper assesses the net impact of changes in tariffs 
and competition laws on innovation, by assessing the impact that these policies have on the 
different aspects of competition. 
Firms in low and middle-income countries in Europe and Central Asia feel greater 
pressure to introduce new products and services and to enter new markets when tariffs are lower.  
Tariffs also affect firms’ perceptions regarding market power.  Firms were less likely to say that 
they believed they could raise prices by 10 percent without losing customers when tariffs were 
lower.  Competition laws also affect competition in these countries.  Firms were more likely to 
say that they felt pressure from competitors and were less likely to say that they could increase 
prices without losing customers in countries where competition policy was stricter and better 
enforced.   
Because tariffs appear to be negatively associated with pressure from competitors (which 
is positively associated with innovation) and domestic price competition (which is negatively 
associated with innovation), the net impact of tariffs on innovation will depend on the 
magnitudes of the opposing affects.  In practice, the net impact appears to be small—although in 
most cases lower tariffs appear to be associated with less innovation.  The point estimates of the 
parameters suggest that the average firm would be about 0.6 percentage points less likely to 
introduce a new production process and 0.1 percentage points less likely to introduce a new 
product if tariffs were set at a uniform 5 percent than if they were set at a uniform 18.3 percent.   
                                                 
28 Increasing the score on the competition policy index from 2.0 to 2.7 would increase the average probabilities by 
between 4.4 and 3.7 percentage points.   28
Given that about 43 percent of enterprises introduced new products and 57 percent introduced 
new production technologies between 1998 and 2001, this appears quite small.  Effects remain 
small when competition is treated as endogenous. 
In contrast, competition law appears more likely to have a positive impact on innovation 
than tariff policy.  When competition is treated as exogenous, firms in countries that required 
pre-merger notification were about 0.9 percentage points less likely to introduce new production 
processes but 0.5 percentage points more likely to introduce new products.  When competition is 
assumed to endogenous, the effect is positive and significantly larger.  Firms in countries that 
required pre-merger notification were about 4 percentage points more likely to introduce new 
production processes and 6 percentage points more likely to introduce new products than firms in 
countries without these requirements. 
In most transition economies, the effectiveness of competition law could be improved.  In 
the most recent assessment by the EBRD, few countries had increased their scores on the index 
of competition policy between the late 1990s and 2003 (European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, 2003).  Most countries had made less progress on this dimension of reform than 
they had on other dimensions—for example, scores on the competition policy index are generally 
significantly lower than scores on the large-scale privatization index (see Table 8)   
Although laws need improving in some countries, for the most part, the problem does not 
appear to be related to the content of the laws.  For example, many of the transition economies—
with a few notable exceptions—scored relatively well on the anti-merger index, a measure based 
on the content of the law rather than on enforcement (see Table 8).  This is consistent with 
evidence from other low and middle-income countries—overall perceptions about the 
effectiveness of anti-competition law is not highly correlated with the content of the law (World 
Bank, 2004).   
Rather the problem appears to be related to enforcement, especially in countries in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States and South Eastern Europe.  For example, in the EBRD’s 
Legal Indicator Survey in 2002,  fewer than 40 percent of respondents in South Eastern Europe 
said that anti-competitive practices were often investigated and prosecuted in their home country 
(Vagliasindi and Campbell, 2004).  In some countries, such as Tajikistan and Serbia and   29
Montenegro, fewer than 20 percent of experts responded that this was the case.  Overall, this 
suggests that there is plenty of scope for improving enforcement in many transition economies.     30
V. TABLES 
Table 1: Utility Patent Applications in the United States, by Country of Origin, 2001. 
  Number of Applications 
Selected Industrialized Economies   
   Belgium  1,013 
   France  5,061 
   Germany  14,415 
   Japan   45,835 
   United Kingdom  5,913 
Transition Economies (Total)  554 
   Albania  0 
   Armenia  1 
   Azerbaijan  1 
   Belarus  3 
   Bosnia & Herzegovina  0 
   Bulgaria  6 
   Croatia  18 
   Czech Republic  38 
   Estonia  5 
   Georgia  4 
   Hungary  96 
   Kazakhstan  1 
   Kyrgyz Republic  0 
   Latvia  2 
   Lithuania  6 
   Macedonia  0 
   Moldova   1 
   Poland  36 
   Romania  8 
   Russian Federation  251 
   Slovakia  5 
   Slovenia   42 
   Ukraine  23 
   Uzbekistan  1 
   Yugoslavia   6 
Source: United States Patent and Trademark Office 
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Table 2: Sample means and standard deviations. 
 Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev. 
Technology      
   Developed major new product in past 3 years  Dummy  1626  0.43  0.49 
   Introduced new production technology  Dummy  1625  0.57  0.50 
Competition Indices        
   Index of price competition  Index (0-4)  1621  2.56  1.08 
   Pressure from foreign competitors Index  (0-4)  1576  2.35  1.14 
   Pressure from domestic competitors  Index (0-4)  1606  2.70  1.04 
Competition Policy        
   Average Tariff Rate (4-figure ISIC)  ---  1518  13.49  14.47 
   Anti-merger Law Index  Index (0-3)  1516  2.57  1.03 
   Days to Register a New Business Natural  Log  1584  3.70  0.46 
   EBRD Competition Policy Index  Index (0-4)  1487  2.21  0.55 
Country Controls        
   Population  Natural Log  1633  16.37  1.30 
   Area in Squared Kilometers Natural  Log  1542  12.27  1.77 
   Per Capita GDP  Natural Log  1633  7.53  0.85 
   Commonwealth of Independent States  Dummy  1633  0.42  0.49 
Enterprise Controls        
   Workers  Natural Log  1565  4.08  1.66 
   Any Government Ownership  Dummy  1633  0.19  0.39 
   Any Foreign Ownership  Dummy  1633  0.21  0.41 
   De novo private enterprise  Dummy  1633  0.53  0.50 
   Exporter   Dummy  1626  0.51  0.50 
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Table 3: Impact of trade and competition policy in competition 
  Domestic price competition 
(High values mean more competition) 
Pressure to develop new products and 
services from foreign competitors 
(High values mean more competition) 
Pressure to develop new products and 
services from competitors 
(High values mean more competition) 
Observations  1198 1206 1438 1162 1167 1387 1189 1197 1421 
Country Dummies  No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Sector Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Competition Policy           
   Average Tariff Rate  -0.0090***  -0.0110***  -0.0106*** -0.0003  -0.0049* -0.0053** -0.0009  -0.0019  -0.0021 
   (at 4-fig ISIC industry level)  (4.52)  (4.42)  (6.11) (0.11) (1.89) (2.14) (0.27) (0.48) (0.98) 
   Competition Policy    0.1739*      -0.1260      0.2656**   
   (index - higher values mean better policy)    (1.68)      (0.97)      (2.32)   
   Merger Notification Law  0.1143*      0.1076**      0.1196     
   (index - higher values mean stricter law)  (1.65)    (2.26)    (1.21)    
   Days to Register a New Business  -0.0845      -0.0646      -0.0484     
   (natural log)  (0.41)      (0.53)      (0.25)     
Enterprise Controls           
   Workers  0.0231  -0.0130  -0.0106  0.0483* 0.0695**  0.0812*** -0.0423  -0.0303  -0.0385 
   (natural log)  (0.63)  (0.34)  (0.28)  (1.72) (2.44) (3.00) (1.44) (1.19) (1.54) 
   Any Government Ownership  0.0396  0.0137  -0.0198 -0.0333 0.0053 -0.0453  -0.2852*** -0.2012** -0.2431*** 
   (dummy)  (0.37)  (0.14)  (0.23)  (0.22) (0.04) (0.35) (3.31) (2.20) (2.91) 
   Any Foreign Ownership  0.0635  0.0555  0.0927 0.0242 0.0440 0.0649  -0.2377** -0.2444** -0.2221** 
    (dummy)  (0.69)  (0.57)  (1.05)  (0.28) (0.47) (0.78) (2.32) (2.24) (2.30) 
    De novo private enterprise  -0.0446  -0.1218 -0.1057 -0.0639 -0.0325 -0.0770 -0.1312*  -0.1271* -0.0963 
   (dummy)  (0.52)  (1.48)  (1.23)  (0.56) (0.30) (0.77) (1.89) (1.92) (1.32) 
    Exporter  -0.2613***  -0.1774***  -0.2270*** 0.3106*** 0.3402*** 0.3060***  -0.2025*  -0.2413*** -0.2030** 
   (dummy)  (3.47)  (2.66)  (3.52)  (3.48) (3.51) (3.88) (1.86) (2.71) (2.00) 
Country Controls           
   Population  0.0770  0.0510   0.1680  0.2438**   0.1279  0.0749  
      (natural  log)  (0.45)  (0.53)  (1.32)  (2.35)  (0.82)  (0.75)  
   Area  -0.1401  -0.0422    -0.2527**  -0.2350***    -0.1075  -0.0055   
   (natural log of squared km)  (0.83)  (0.63)  (2.40)  (3.71)  (0.69)  (0.07)  
   Per Capita GDP  0.2321  0.0245  0.1322  0.1123*   0.3020  0.0742  
   (natural log -- US$)  (1.15)  (0.22)  (1.34)  (1.76)  (1.55)  (0.59)  
   Commonwealth of Independent States  0.1652  -0.2172  0.0278  -0.2512*   0.0542  -0.3119  
      (dummy)  (0.52)  (0.88)  (0.16)  (1.91)  (0.17)  (1.27)  
Pseudo R-Squared  0.05 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.07 
*** Sig. at 1% level   ** Sig. at 5% level  * Sig. at 10% level.    Note:  Regressions are estimated using ordered probit estimation.  T-statistics are in parentheses.  Standard errors are Huber-White robust 
standard errors allowing error terms to be correlated within countries.  Regressions include dummy variables indicating country and sector of operations (at 4-figure ISIC level).   
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Table 4: Impact of Competition on Adoption of Production Processes 
Dependent Variable  New Process Development 
(Dummy) 
Observations  1394 1472 1401 1447 1394 1394 
Country Dummies  No Yes No No No No 
Sector Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Competition        
   Pressure from foreign and domestic competitors  0.0528*** 0.0556*** 0.0371***   0.0103   
   (index - high values mean more competition) (3.52)  (3.53)  (2.65)    (0.26)   
   Square of pressure from competitors          0.0107   
   (squared index)          (1.06)   
   Domestic price competition  -0.0606***-0.0657***  -0.0496***  -0.0248  -0.0600***
   (index - high values mean more competition)  (5.93)  (6.88)  (5.33)  (0.36)  (5.77) 
   Square of domestic price competition          -0.0068   
   (squared index)          (0.51)   
   Pressure from foreign competitors            0.0408** 
   (index - higher values mean more pressure)            (2.33) 
   Pressure from domestic competitors            0.0274* 
   (index - higher values mean more pressure)            (1.79) 
Enterprise Controls        
   Workers  0.0312*** 0.0342*** 0.0302** 0.0312*** 0.0312***  0.0305** 
   (natural log)  (2.65)  (3.02)  (2.44)  (2.66)  (2.62)  (2.54) 
   Any Government Ownership  -0.0952** -0.0930** -0.0974** -0.1143** -0.0940* -0.0972**
   (dummy)  (2.00)  (2.22)  (2.14)  (2.30)  (1.95)  (2.02) 
   Any Foreign Ownership  -0.0242 -0.0199 -0.0263 -0.0208 -0.0224 -0.0262 
   (dummy)  (0.60)  (0.54)  (0.68)  (0.52)  (0.55)  (0.66) 
   De novo private enterprise 0.0797*  0.0754*  0.0841*  0.0674  0.0817*  0.0790* 
   (dummy)  (1.79)  (1.79)  (1.93)  (1.54)  (1.82)  (1.79) 
   Exporter  0.0591**  0.0377 0.0763*** 0.0622**  0.0595** 0.0556* 
   (dummy)  (2.00)  (1.43)  (2.59)  (2.05)  (2.04)  (1.82) 
Country Controls        
   Population  0.0290    0.0278  0.0337  0.0270  0.0289 
   (natural log)  (0.75)    (0.71)  (0.85)  (0.67)  (0.75) 
   Area  -0.0580***   -0.0541** -0.0613*** -0.0558**  -0.0571**
   (natural log of squared km)  (2.66)    (2.34) (2.78) (2.47) (2.57) 
   Per Capita GDP  -0.0127    -0.0220 -0.0041 -0.0140 -0.0123 
   (natural log -- US$)  (0.60)    (1.07)  (0.19)  (0.64)  (0.59) 
   Commonwealth of Independent States  0.0873*    0.0740  0.0756  0.0854*  0.0871* 
   (dummy)  (1.88)    (1.55)  (1.41)  (1.80)  (1.87) 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.09 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 
Note:  :  Coefficients for indices and continuous variable are marginal effects.  Coefficients for dummy variables are the effect of switching from 
a “0” to a “1”.  T-statistics are in parentheses.  Standard errors are Huber-White robust standard errors allowing error terms to be correlated 
within countries.  Regressions include dummy variables indicating country and sector of operations (at 4-figure ISIC level).  Regressions are 
estimated using probit estimation.   
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Table 5: Impact of Competition on New Product Development 
Dependent Variable  New Product Development 
(Dummy) 
Observations  1399 1477 1406 1452 1399 1399 
Country Dummies  No Yes No No No No 
Sector Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Competition        
   Pressure from foreign and domestic competitors  0.0731*** 0.0621*** 0.0640***   0.1741***  
   (index - high values mean more competition) (4.91)  (4.08)  (4.34)    (3.58)   
   Square of pressure from competitors          -0.0255**  
   (squared index)          (2.26)   
   Domestic price competition  -0.0309** -0.0420***  -0.0167  -0.0870  -0.0303**
   (index - high values mean more competition)  (2.07)  (3.16)  (1.15)  (1.48)  (2.04) 
   Square of domestic price  competition       0.0106   
   (squared index)          (0.98)   
   Pressure from foreign competitors            0.0538***
   (index - higher values mean more pressure)            (4.31) 
   Pressure from domestic competitors            0.0409** 
   (index - higher values mean more pressure)            (2.50) 
Enterprise Controls        
   Workers  0.0653*** 0.0613*** 0.0631*** 0.0643***  0.0654*** 0.0646***
   (natural log)  (5.77)  (5.15)  (5.25)  (5.45)  (5.80)  (5.50) 
   Any Government Ownership  -0.1557***-0.1439***-0.1577***-0.1753*** -0.1584***-0.1577***
   (dummy)  (3.08)  (2.74)  (3.14)  (3.52)  (3.17)  (3.16) 
   Any Foreign Ownership  -0.0190 -0.0243 -0.0181 -0.0150 -0.0228 -0.0212 
   (dummy)  (0.45)  (0.64)  (0.43)  (0.39)  (0.55)  (0.51) 
   De novo private enterprise 0.1542*** 0.1595*** 0.1536*** 0.1410***  0.1508*** 0.1538***
   (dummy)  (3.97)  (4.07)  (3.91)  (3.60)  (3.86)  (3.97) 
   Exporter  0.1095*** 0.1108*** 0.1207*** 0.1275*** 0.1084*** 0.1054***
   (dummy)  (2.89)  (2.70)  (3.08)  (3.18)  (2.80)  (2.83) 
Country Controls        
   Population  -0.0429    -0.0440  -0.0256  -0.0377  -0.0430 
   (natural log)  (1.08)    (1.13)  (0.62)  (0.95)  (1.08) 
   Area  0.0200    0.0227  0.0077  0.0146  0.0209 
   (natural log of squared km)  (0.71)  (0.81)  (0.28)  (0.53)  (0.74) 
   Per Capita GDP  -0.0549   -0.0619  -0.0322  -0.0526  -0.0542 
   (natural log -- US$)  (1.11)    (1.29)  (0.68)  (1.05)  (1.10) 
   Commonwealth of Independent States  0.1487    0.1387  0.1482  0.1541  0.1486 
   (dummy)  (1.54)    (1.44)  (1.55)  (1.60)  (1.54) 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.12 0.16 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.12 
Note:  Coefficients for indices and continuous variable are marginal effects.  Coefficients for dummy variables are the effect of switching from a 
“0” to a “1”.  T-statistics are in parentheses.  Standard errors are Huber-White robust standard errors allowing error terms to be correlated within 
countries.  Regressions include dummy variables indicating country and sector of operations (at 4-figure ISIC level). Regressions are estimated 
using probit estimation.   
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Table 6:  Effect of adding additional measures of competition and pressure to innovate 
 
New Process Development 
(Dummy) 
New Product Development 
(Dummy) 
Observations  1292 1337 1282 1298 1342 1284 
Country Dummies  No No No No No No 
Sector Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Competition        
   Pressure from foreign and domestic competitors 0.0468*** 0.0538*** 0.0458*** 0.0682*** 0.0679*** 0.0587***
   (index - high values mean more competition)  (3.37) (3.75) (2.84) (4.25) (4.19) (3.99) 
    Domestic price competition  -0.0544*** -0.0542*** -0.0695*** -0.0231  -0.0253*  -0.0345**
   (index - high values mean more competition)  (5.56) (5.42) (6.21) (1.55) (1.70) (2.24) 
Additional Measures of Competition        
  Market Share  0.0006      -0.0001     
    (percentage)  (0.98)    (0.18)    
  Number of Competitors    -0.0337***     0.0051   
   (2.76)    (0.32)  
Additional Measures of Pressure to Innovate        
   Pressure from creditors, shareholders, government and customers      0.0293***     0.0403** 
  (index - high values mean more competition)      (3.09)      (2.15) 
Enterprise Controls        
   Workers  0.0228*  0.0251**  0.0308**  0.0640***  0.0617*** 0.0658***
      (natural  log)  (1.88) (2.07) (2.42) (5.68) (5.34) (5.38) 
   Any Government Ownership  -0.1041** -0.1098** -0.0937*  -0.1507***  -0.1536*** -0.1454***
      (dummy)  (2.05) (2.34) (1.86) (2.94) (3.12) (2.64) 
   Any Foreign Ownership  -0.0400  -0.0510  -0.0287  -0.0021  -0.0249  -0.0150 
      (dummy)  (1.02) (1.32) (0.72) (0.05) (0.64) (0.36) 
   De novo private enterprise  0.0506  0.0609  0.0880*  0.1422***  0.1435*** 0.1724***
      (dummy)  (1.17) (1.37) (1.84) (3.72) (3.74) (4.39) 
   Exporter  0.0809*** 0.0641**  0.0436  0.1114***  0.1173*** 0.1009***
      (dummy)  (2.86) (2.11) (1.40) (2.93) (3.12) (2.68) 
Country Controls        
   Population  0.0284  0.0290  0.0276  -0.0342  -0.0435  -0.0659* 
      (natural  log)  (0.72) (0.77) (0.73) (0.77) (1.03) (1.72) 
   Area  -0.0527** -0.0566*** -0.0624*** 0.0092  0.0167  0.0306 
   (natural log of squared km)  (2.34)  (2.66)  (2.82)  (0.31)  (0.58)  (1.09) 
   Per Capita GDP  0.0016  -0.0069  -0.0104  -0.0429  -0.0513  -0.0719 
   (natural log -- US$)  (0.07)  (0.32)  (0.47)  (0.81)  (0.99)  (1.55) 
   Commonwealth of Independent States  0.0808  0.0791*  0.0961**  0.1589  0.1503  0.1226 
      (dummy)  (1.58) (1.70) (2.30) (1.47) (1.44) (1.35) 
Pseudo  R-Squared  0.09 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.12 0.14 
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Table 7: Impact of Competition on New Product Development allowing competition to be 
determined endogenously 
 
New Product Development 
(Dummy) 
New Process Development 
(Dummy) 
Observations  1155 1149 1144 1138 
Country Dummies      
Sector Dummies      
Competition      
   Index of pressure from foreign and domestic competitors 0.4727*  0.5409**  0.3963*  0.5003* 
   (index - high values mean more competition)  (1.89) (1.98) (1.73) (1.89) 
   Index of price competition    -0.1397    -0.1632 
   (index - high values mean more  competition)   (0.64)  (0.77) 
Enterprise Controls      
   Workers  0.0593***  0.0627***  0.0260  0.0299* 
   (natural log)  (3.45)  (3.46)  (1.62)  (1.70) 
   Any Government Ownership  -0.0316  -0.0149  -0.0700  -0.0462 
      (dummy)  (0.36) (0.16) (0.85) (0.49) 
   Any Foreign Ownership  0.0298  0.0347  0.0066  0.0171 
      (dummy)  (0.47) (0.50) (0.11) (0.25) 
   De novo private enterprise  0.1956***  0.1894***  0.0871  0.0796 
      (dummy)  (3.18) (2.96) (1.53) (1.30) 
   Exporter  0.1103**  0.0657  0.0618  0.0088 
      (dummy)  (1.97) (0.78) (1.19) (0.11) 
Country Controls      
   Population  -0.1681***  -0.1586***  -0.0564  -0.0471 
   (natural log)  (2.82)  (2.67)  (1.01)  (0.82) 
   Area  0.1399**  0.1290**  0.0318  0.0214 
   (natural log of squared km)  (2.47)  (2.28)  (0.60)  (0.39) 
   Per Capita GDP  -0.2158***  -0.1937**  -0.1052  -0.0837 
   (natural log -- US$)  (2.92)  (2.50)  (1.54)  (1.13) 
   Commonwealth of Independent States  0.1254*  0.1555*  0.1064  0.1451* 
      (dummy)  (1.70) (1.88) (1.52) (1.76) 
Pseudo R-Squared  0.13 0.13 0.08 0.08 
Note:  T-statistics are in parentheses.  Standard errors are Huber-White robust standard errors allowing error terms to be correlated within 
countries.  Regressions include dummy variables indicating country and sector of operations (at 4-figure ISIC level).  Instruments are the 
measures of competition policy—tariffs at 4-figure ISIC level, merger notification law index and days to register a new business.  Regressions are 
estimated using probit estimation allowing for Endogeneity. 
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Table 8: Competition policy indices in sample countries, 2001. 
  Average Tariff  







 Albania  15.1 3  1.7  2.3 
 Armenia  4.6 0  2  3.3 
 Azerbaijan  11.0 3  2  2 
 Belarus  15.9 3  2  1 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina  8.9 ---  1  2.3 
 Bulgaria  21.9 3  2.3  3.7 
 Croatia  12.4 3  2.3  3 
 Czech  5.8 3  3  4 
 Estonia  0.5 3 2.7  4 
 FYROM  26.3 3  2  3 
 Georgia  --- 0  2  3.3 
 Hungary  16.9 3  3  4 
 Kazakhstan  --- 3  2  3 
 Kyrgyz Republic  10.4   2  3 
 Latvia  4.8 3 2.3  3.3 
 Lithuania  9.6 3  3  3.7 
 Moldova  11.4 3  2  3 
 Poland  19.4 3  3  3.3 
 Romania  23.8 3  2.3  3.3 
 Russia  10.7 3  2.3  3.3 
 Slovakia  28.0 2  3  4 
 Slovenia  11.3 3  2.7  3 
 Tajikistan  10.4 0  1.7  2.3 
 Turkey  8.5 3 ---  --- 
 Ukraine  11.8 3  2.3  3 
 Uzbekistan  12.4 3  2  2.7 
 Serbia and Montenegro  --- 0  1  2 
   38
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